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Chapter XII 
Panel Discussion: The Environmental Threat 
of Military Operations 
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.): Good afternoon. I am Jim 
Doyle. I have the unenviable task of trying to come to grips with the facts of the 
situation. First of all, let me say what a great pleasure it is to be back up here at 
the Naval War College at one of Jack's forays and to see many old friends and to 
meet some new ones. In addressing this balancing role, that is, trying to figure out 
the risks versus the benefits of protecting the environment during combat, it is 
always helpful to know what the facts are in order not only to develop realistic 
international law related to armed conflict, but also to provide the basis for sound 
policy choices. Our panel will, hopefully, provide some insights as a basis for the 
discussions that will follow in subsequent panels. To the best of our knowledge, 
what are the actual effects on the environment of various land, sea, and air combat 
operations? Or, even before combat operations, in training and readiness, and all 
the other operations we are calling "peaceful deployments", to actually deploying 
armed forces in combat, what are the impacts of our operations on the 
environment? Are the effects upon the environment of those actions negligible? 
Are they short-term or are they long-term? If they are short-term or long-term, 
how would you characterize the significance of the effect upon the environment? 
Do the effects trigger collateral effects and, in turn, are they short-term or long-term? 
How significant might such collateral effects be? What is the relationship of the 
various combat operations to the accomplishment of the mission, and very 
importantly, as we heard just a moment ago, in what context are they being carried 
out? Now these are all very tough questions for our panel but we have a very 
distinguished group of panelists that will try to come to grips with this enquiry. As 
Admiral Stark and others have pointed out, the business of operating at the limited 
end of the spectrum of conflict poses a tough challenge in considering the possible 
environmental impacts of combat operations. Not only are you trying to limit the war 
and, hopefully, bring it to a diplomatic conclusion, you are also trying to limit any 
damage to the environment because you are probably going to have to go in there 
sooner or later and redress any environmental damage you may have caused. Well, we 
are going to have to try to come to grips with that. 
Our first speaker will be Colonel Frank R. Finch, Director of Environmental 
Programs in the Army. His mission is to ensure that the Army complies with all 
applicable environmental laws and regulations. Colonel Finch has had various 
command and staff assignments both within the United States and overseas, 
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including Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering, U.S. Army Pacific, and the 
Commander of the Baltimore District of the Army Corps of Engineers. Frank 
would you lead off? 
Colonel Frank R. Finch, U.S. Army: Good afternoon. My task, as the Admiral 
indicated, is to look at the environmental threat of Army operations. But, before 
I begin summarizing my paper, I would like to just add a follow-on note to our last 
panel. There was some discussion as to the extent military people are trained to 
be conscious of environmental considerations as they prepare to go into combat 
or to go to war. I can respond to that question from personal experience. One of 
the things that we do out of my office is to run the Army's environmental hot line. 
This is, in reality, an assistance line, a one-stop 800 number, if you will, for anyone 
to call in and ask for help, whether it be with regulatory interpretations, or more 
complicated scientific questions. About a year ago, when the 10th Mountain 
Division was preparing to go in to what at that time looked like a hostile landing 
in Haiti, we handled dozens of phone calls from 10th Mountain planners and 
operators that were in their war planning process. They were developing plans 
both for deployment and for combat operations, and they were very concerned 
about doing all the proper things environmentally. We had quite a time answering 
all the questions they raised in making sure that they were approaching their duties 
in a diligent manner. I think that is just one indicator that our culture has changed 
considerably. For those of you who are not in the military and do not see it on a 
day-to-day basis, I think you would be surprised, pleasantly surprised, at the extent 
to which we have incorporated environmental planning into our day-to-day 
business. 
With that as a preface, let me try to summarize the key points of my paper. It's 
a lengthy paper and I will just address the highlights so that we will have plenty 
of time for discussion. First of all, I think we all recognize that environmental 
threats have been an inherent part of warfare as long as mankind has had conflict. 
By definition, in warfare both sides are committed to a cause that they are prepared 
to die for and are prepared to kill for. Very often, environmental considerations 
are not an important factor in the decision-making process. What I am going to 
try to do is to show you how we have analyzed the threat to the environment posed 
by combat operations in terms of scope and scale. I think that there has been a lot 
of discussion already today that that is an important factor in the planning process. 
It is not a black, white, or binary discussion here that is necessary, but a whole 
spectrUm of conflict and a whole spectrUm of threats. In my paper, I go back to 
400 B.C. Greece, where one of the first cases of a sacred temple being despoiled by 
the Athenians is recorded. This was done as a deliberate action and was designed 
basically just to antagonize the enemy. In the second century B.C., the Romans 
spread salt on the fields of Carthage to destroy their crops and to poison their soil. 
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Sherman's march to the sea during the Civil War destroyed Confederate 
agriculture and industrial resources. In World War II there were many such 
occurrences. For example, the Russians used a scorched earth policy on their own 
territory to deny Germany the resources to continue its offensive. With respect to 
Vietnam, we have already discussed herbicides and their uses on vegetation in 
order to deny the enemy concealment. The long-term effects of herbicide use in 
Vietnam are still unclear. In the 1980s, the Soviets destroyed crops in the fields of 
Afghanistan to deny food to the rebels. During Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis 
looted agriculture resources, destroyed irrigation capabilities, and destroyed oil 
processing facilities. Again, some of these actions are going to take us years to 
remedy. In my paper, I suggest a model to analyze hazards and note that the largest 
body of scientific analyses in this area comes from risk assessment of hazardous 
waste disposal operations. And here the general model to determine the hazard of 
any contemplated action is to look at a source-pathway-receptor process. A simple 
military example would be chemical nerve agents. Chemical nerve agents are the 
most toxic chemicals on earth. A person even briefly exposed to a small quantity 
of these chemicals will die, absent appropriate medical attention. Most such agents 
work either by being breathed or through absorption in the skin. Chemical nerve 
agents are delivered usually by air transport through spraying or through explosive 
munitions. Using the model that I described, the chemical agent is the source, air 
is the pathway, and the soldier is the receptor; you need all three to have a complete 
threat. 
My paper then addresses the multiple sources of military threats to the natural 
environment. They could involve any physical, chemical, or biological agent that 
is capable of producing a specific harm or damage. The paper describes many of 
the sources of such threats. Let me read a few of them. Explosives, projectiles, 
chemical weapons, biological agents, and nuclear weapons are obvious ones. But, 
there is a much longer and less obvious list of hazardous sources, primarily 
chemicals, that are also essential in combat, including petroleum products, 
chemicals for biological and chemical decontamination, infectious waste from 
medical facilities, spent batteries, pesticides, and so forth. The list is almost 
endless. Contaminant sources may also be an indirect result of military operations, 
such as waste water treatment facilities that discharge untreated sewage following 
damage by an artillery shell. 
There are many ways we can categorize threat sources and effects and so forth; 
I try to offer a few in my paper. I think it is important to distinguish deliberate 
effects from accidental effects. Each hazard source must also be analyzed to 
determine its hazard potential. Again, borrowing from the hazardous waste 
management process, we can classify these hazards as corrosive, ignitable, reactive, 
toxic, and infectious. We can also look at time frames, "acute" means those that 
have an immediate impact on health, and "chronic" means those that require some 
Panel Discussion 151 
period of time to produce an adverse effect. Nations see and feel the immediate 
effects of acute warfare and its hazards but they feel and they worry about chronic 
effects such as we saw with Agent Orange, nuclear exposure, or the unknown effects 
associated with the so-called "Gulf Syndrome" ,for example. Effects on the ecology 
are equally uncertain. 
My paper also briefly discusses pathways, and I think one important point to 
look at is when you do not have all three elements of the source-pathway-receptor 
model. Chemical warfare is possible and indeed we prepared for it in the Gulf War 
because we had protective gear. That protective gear was intended to interrupt the 
pathway. You still had a source; you still had a receptor, but you didn't have a 
pathway if you had protective chemical gear that is working properly. Likewise, 
if you have a non-mobile agent located in an area without receptors, you do not 
have a risk because it too lacks a pathway. 
I spent a great deal of time in my paper talking about "uncertainty" and this 
probably deserves its own conference. But environmental persistence is a major 
factor. Chemical, biological, and radiological agents may transform when they are 
released into the environment. These processes can be chemical reactions, physical 
degradation, or biologically driven reactions. The products of these reactions may 
be more or less hazardous than the original agent. There are numerous 
mechanisms that influence the decay or change of an agent in the environment. 
One of these is hydrolysis, which is a reaction of water that can yield a different 
chemical. Another is photolysis reactions which are powered by sunlight in air, 
transforming vapors and aerosols. Biological agents will either grow, die, or 
mutate, depending upon environmental conditions they encounter. Chemicals in 
the water and in the soil are susceptible under the proper conditions to 
bio-degradation or bio-accumulation. As a common example, bio-accumulation of 
PCBs in fish living in contaminated streams represent a hazard to the organisms 
that eat the fish. To continue on with elements of uncertainty, the amount of 
contamination that reaches the receptor, and the rate at which it is absorbed, are 
determined by many factors as is the case of accumulation levels. Physical 
characteristics of the receptor are also key, such as body weight, lung capacity, skin 
surface area; and they influence the amount of contamination that actually enters 
the body. Inhalation rate, water uptake rate, and duration of exposure are three 
obvious factors that are important. 
The graphic that I use in my paper lays out these categories. The left hand side 
of the graphic lists the pre-combat phase, preparation to go to war, the combat 
phase, and the post-combat phase. This listing is further broken down to reflect 
acute and chronic effects. Across the top of the graphic are the Model categories 
of source, pathway, and receptor that I mentioned, as well as hazard classification. 
You can use this model to go through the various phases of combat operations and 
determine whether you are dealing with acute or chronic conditions. 
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The next point that I want to make is that our weapons production system has 
produced major contamination problems for this country. I would like to read to 
you a short passage from the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. 
Congress. That office had this to say about the long-term environmental effects of 
weapons production: 
Many factors have contributed to the current waste and contamination problems at 
the weapons sites. The nature of manufacturing processes, which are inherently waste 
producing, [have a] long history of emphasizing the urgency of weapons production 
in the interest of national security to the neglect of environmental contamination, a 
lack of knowledge about or attention to the consequences of environmental 
contamination, and it is an enterprise that has operated in secrecy for decades without 
any independent oversight or meaningful public scrutiny. 
My paper briefly discusses Agent Orange from the standpoint that its half-life, 
when measured on a leaf, is two hours. Whereas, its half-life, when measured in 
soil, is ten years. Because its toxicity is so extreme, half-life becomes a very, very 
important factor when talking about soil contamination. 
The next major point was alluded to this morning-targeting of certain large 
facilities that support a nation's war-fighting capability can have tremendous 
short-term effects on the environment and also can have certain long-term effects. 
My paper uses the example of the RAF bombing of the Mohne Dam in May of 
1943. In the initial planning, the Allies focused on Hitler's industrial base and his 
ability to wage war. When the dam was breached, one thousand houses were 
destroyed or damaged; 11 factories were destroyed, and 114 damaged; and 25 road 
bridges were destroyed, and 10 damaged. Various power stations, pumping 
stations, water and gas facilities were also put out of action. The long-term 
environmental effects of this action are unknown. Damage to the environment was 
not analyzed at the time of the bombing and it is difficult to assess it 
retrospectively. It is unknown what types of factories were destroyed and what 
hazardous materials entered the Ruhr River. We know some chemicals would 
hydrolyze, some would settle out, and still others might bio- accumulate in 
organisms or biologically degrade. 
My next major point, also mentioned this morning, is that predictions of the 
environmental threat of military operations can be exaggerated. We have all talked 
about the oil spills and the destruction of the oil facilities in Kuwait. Most early 
coverage of this included some very dire predictions about the magnitude and 
duration o(this effect. Believe me, I am not trying to minimize this problem, but 
I just want to put it in perspective. The original estimate to stop the oil fires ranged 
from two to five years. In fact, innovative technology was developed during the 
recovery operations and reduced this time to less than nine months. Also, the 
predicted impact of the smoke that suggested large regional and even global 
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damage was mitigated somewhat by meteorological conditions that fortunately 
limited some of the severe environmental effects to very localized areas. However, 
the long-term effects of this, both the oil spills and the oil fires, is still being 
examined. I think it is important to not draw any premature conclusions. 
I wanted to mention a point that I do not believe we have discussed yet. One 
long-term effect of military operations is that it is difficult to quantify the loss of 
talented people, historical records, and scientific equipment and capability. They 
could be used to provide better analysis of environmental problems and better 
strategies to recover and, indeed, to rebuild the country in question. Targeting of 
nuclear facilities or chemical facilities is, of course, a special concern. In the 
Bosnian conflict, we have seen war damage to some fifty factories along the 
Danube. Hazardous chemicals were involved in production of weapons and 
explosives there, as well as metal plating and refining of oil. Now these pollutants 
can be passed along downstream where they can settle in the river bottoms to be 
a future problem during dredging or whenever the river bottom is disturbed. Back 
in 1984, we had a well-known industrial incident in Bhopal, India which killed 
2300 people and injured 20 to 30 thousand others. This accident was due to a small 
amount of water being released into a storage tank of methyl isocyanide. Collateral 
damage from military operations could cause a similar tank to rupture and be 
exposed to water with equally horrendous results. The Bhopol plant was an 
insecticide processing factory similar to those in many countries. 
U.S. concern for environmental impacts is much greater and more sophisticated 
than it ever has been. However, potential adversaries may not share our ethical 
frame work. I think we discussed that at length this morning. The current military 
trend in armed conflict doctrine, as described, for example, in the Army's Force 
XXI doctrine, stresses information processing and technological innovations 
which reduce the size of the force, increase precision and lethality, and increase 
land area operations. Although the technology within U.S. and NATO forces is 
advanced, the technology of our enemy may run the spectrum. It is likely that 
environmental threats and impacts on the land caused by U.S. forces could 
decrease. However, as was stated earlier, in Operation Desert Storm, although 
everyone saw on CNN how precise our laser guided weapons could be, 93 percent 
of the ordinance that was dropped was gravity bombs, of which 70 percent missed 
their target. So, although we think of the Gulf War as a precision guided weapons 
war, there was a great deal of conventional ordinance dropped with inevitable 
collateral damage to the environment. 
In the concluding comments of my paper, I make several points to place all of 
this in context. First, I stress the utility of the use of the model for analysis of the 
threat. Secondly, I believe the environmental impact of military operations can be 
exaggerated in the short-term, and I also believe it is very difficult to predict in 
the long-term. Many people are studying the effects of the Gulf War and it is too 
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early to say what the long-term damage to the environment is. Commanders should 
make military operational decisions when fully apprised of the risks and the 
uncertainties of environmental effects of their plans. There are times when 
military necessity would dictate that military operations will cause some adverse 
effect on the environment. But, as has been said earlier, commanders have an 
obligation to show due regard for the environment and to avoid unnecessary 
damage. Third, our ability to mitigate the effects of our combat activity has grown 
immensely. Fourth, our ability to clean up unexploded ordinance, particularly 
buried land mines, continues to challenge environmental resources and technology. 
I did not discuss that very much here, but it is a hugeproblem-detection and removal 
is a tedious and dangerous process for unexploded ordnance. Finally, as we assess 
environmental risks, we have to remember that a full range of warfare is possible 
and that other nations may not share our environmental ethic. The use of terrorist 
tactics against facilities which specifically target damage to the environment is 
very possible, and we have seen it in our most recent contlict. Thank you. 
Vice Admiral Doyle, Jr.: Thank you very much Frank. Our next speaker is 
Commander John Quinn, JAGC, USN. John is a graduate of Duke University. He 
entered the Navy as a Supply Corps officer but soon thereafter saw the light and 
became a lawyer. He is a graduate of Georgetown Law School and has a Master of 
Laws in Environmental Law from George Washington University. John is now 
the Environmental Counsel to the Chief of Naval Operations, Environmental 
Protection Division, and is representing the Director of that Division, Rear 
Admiral Schreifer, here today. I might add that he previously served as 
Environmental Counsel on the Staff of CINCPACFLT. John. 
Commander John P. Quinn,JAGC, U.S. Navy: Thank you very much Admiral. 
I would at the outset like to convey Rear Admiral Schreifer's regrets that he is not 
able to be with you today. He very much wanted to be here. He is currently the 
acting Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. Dr. Ron DeMarco, 
representing the Office of Naval Research, and I have prepared a paper which we 
will be alluding to in our remarks. We will present a three-part discussion of the 
impact of combat and military operations other than war on the marine 
environment. Actually, I have the easy part. I get to lead off and do one of those 
parts and then Dr. DeMarco will take over and do the other two. What we would 
like to do is pose two questions and then hypothesize an answer. The first question 
is what should military planners and military commanders know about the marine 
environment as they prepare to, and actually do execute their missions. That is 
the part that I will address. The second part, which Dr. DeMarco will take, is the 
question of what actually do we know, and how extensive is our knowledge about 
the effect of combat and operations other than war on the marine environment. 
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He will point out that despite the fact that we do have a great deal of knowledge 
in this area, we have just scratched the surface, if you will, and there is still a great 
deal of uncertainty and unreliability, as has been mentioned several times so far 
today, regarding the anticipated effects versus what actually did occur with the 
benefit of hindsight. Dr. DeMarco will then offer a model for policy makers 
evaluating and dealing with this scientific uncertainty. 
Moving into the first part, what should military planners know about the effects 
of their operations on the marine environment? As I look at the statement of 
purpose for this Symposium, I note that it is mainly internationally focused, and 
appropriately so. The focus is to examine the existing international legal order to 
determine if it adequately proscribes environmental damage not justified by 
military necessity during armed conflict and to determine, basically, if that regime 
is adequate. The second purpose is to examine the interrelationship of the law of 
armed conflict and the peacetime environmental regime as well as the adequacy 
of existing mechanisms to enforce State responsibility, etc. As a person who is 
trained in and whose experience for the last six years has been primarily in 
domestic U.S. environmental law, as it affects the Navy, I think we would be remiss 
if we didn't pause during this Symposium and at least acknowledge the extent of 
requirements upon military operations that are imposed by the domestic law of 
the United States, perhaps by the domestic law of other nations, and acknowledge 
the extent to which those requirements actually travel with military forces in 
peacetime and to a certain extent in wartime as well. 
I will postulate that there is a continuum of action starting from peacetime 
operations and carrying all the way through military operations other than war 
and into limited war and total war. This is a continuum of intensity of action, if 
you will, and I just ask you to reflect on what legal regime controls each stage of 
that process. At what point does one legal regime end and another pick up? From 
the standpoint of domestic U.S. law applicable to the operations of the military, 
and particularly the Navy and the Coast Guard since we are charged with 
discussing the marine environment here, I would advance two propositions. One 
is that there are very substantial requirements to collect information about the 
impacts of war on the marine environment, and to analyze and consider that 
information in decision-making mechanisms, that are imposed by domestic law. 
Secondly, to a great extent, the requirements to acquire information and to 
consider it, at least from the domestic law standpoint of the United States, do not 
disappear in time of conflict. They may be modified. In fact they are modified to 
some extent. But, it is important to acknowledge that they do not entirely 
disappear, and perhaps to reflect on what the meaning of that may be. I would like 
to illustrate that by looking at three aspects of U.S. law very briefly and to then 
compare and contrast their peacetime requirements with what those requirements 
are in war. 
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Colonel Finch mentioned environmental planning, the environmental 
planning done by the Army in preparation to going into a foreign country for 
purposes of conducting a military operation other than war. We have a very strong 
environmental planning regime in this country that has been in existence as early 
as 1970. The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies to 
document the effects of their actions on the environment, including the marine 
environment, for any activity that would be considered a major federal action 
significantly effecting the quality of the human environment. In carrying out those 
responsibilities, the military services spend a lot of money and time and effort 
documenting what these impacts might be. This particular requirement travels 
with the Navy as it leaves port, at least as far out as the territorial limits of the 
United States, and it is a requirement that we pay a lot of time and attention to in 
order to stay on the right side of the law. 
Beyond our territorial seas, the conduct of the military in this arena is directed 
by Executive Order 12114, which requires certain examinations of the 
environmental consequences of our actions on the global commons and even 
within the territory of foreign countries. There are a number of exemptions and 
qualifications to those requirements, the ultimate effect being that, for the most 
part, an operation such as war or an armed conflict other than war would almost 
certainly not be subject to the environmental studies requirement. But, certain 
other activities that might be conducted in the marine environment, during 
peacetime in particular, would be so subject and, in fact, the requirements are 
adhered to. 
Now as far as the National Environmental Policy Act is concerned, how far into 
the continuum toward war does that extend? There is no national security 
exemption provided for in that Act. It does not say, "This does not apply during 
war," as do a few statues, mainly those pertaining to vessel source pollution. There 
is simply a requirement or proviso in the Act that in an emergency-not war-the 
agency concerned can consult with the Council on Environmental Quality and 
they will figure out how to do the right thing. In fact, as our paper points out, that 
has had to be done on a couple of occasions due to military exigency during 
Operation Desert Storm pertaining to some operations that had to take place back 
then. 
The environmental planning requirements of the National Environment Policy 
Act and Executive Order 12114 are significant, substantial information gathering 
and analyses requirements that the United States military must and does consider. 
They are, however, requirements that are only procedural in nature. They do not 
necessarily require that you make the environmentally correct call, simply that 
you document and that you consider what the effects are, the objective being 
enlightened decision-making. There are two other U.S. statues, however, that 
impose not only information requirements but substantive requirements on what 
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we can do. Those are the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, both of which control U.S. entities on the high seas world-wide 
with regard to their requirements not to "take" an endangered species or a marine 
mammal of any description. If your activity, possibly including war, might result 
in a "take", than the requirement of these two Acts is to get a permit from the 
appropriate wildlife agency. In the process of getting such a permit, a considerable 
amount of biological information must be collected, provided and considered, 
most generally in a public way. Again, these requirements are extra-territorial, that 
is, they travel with the military when the military does travel. There are some 
qualifications to these actions under the Endangered Species Act. For example, 
there is a "relief valve". If an action otherwise must be taken, a committee of 
Cabinet level officials may grant an exemption from the requirements of the Act, 
but only after a certain process has taken place, which may make it difficult to take 
action in a very timely manner during a military exigency. Under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act there is also such a "relief valve". These mandates of U.S. 
domestic law include quite substantial requirements, requirements that do not 
necessarily terminate, as you might think, the moment that we move into war or 
operations other than war. Moreover, at least several of them are extra-territorial 
in terms of their reach. 
So what is the bottom line here? There are environmental constraints other 
than those imposed by international law on what the military is able to do. We 
need to access our environmental posture with regard to staying within the 
guidelines, assess the risks of our military operations, and assess the risks of being 
perceived not to be in compliance with domestic and international environmental 
standards. As has been said numerous times throughout this Symposium, and 
from my perspective in the environmental compliance business of the Navy, I can 
attest that there seems to be a true environmental ethic that has evolved over the 
last number of years in part driven by requirements such as these. This ethic is in 
part driven by the fact that the Navy now consists, in significant part, of young 
men and women that have grown up with Big Bird telling them to recycle, and so 
forth. These people are now lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and senior 
enlisted people. They are truly imbued with an environmental ethic. 
Consequently, these requirements are viewed as consistent with military 
operations to the extent that we will take every measure that we possibly can to 
protect the environment, consistent with the mission. I would like, at this point, 
to turn the rostrum over to Dr. DeMarco. Having talked about what the 
commander should know, Dr. DeMarco will now tell us what we do know. 
Vice Admiral Doyle: Thank you John. I am going to have to look into some of 
those provisions in our domestic law. Our next speaker is Dr. Ron DeMarco. He 
is one of our very dedicated Senior Executive Service civilians of the Naval 
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establishment. He is the Director of Environmental Programs of the Office of 
Naval Research. In this capacity, he directs Navy-relevant research in the areas of 
chemistry, physics, and interdisciplinary environmental research. His past 
assignmeilts have included Head of the Advanced Inorganic Materials Section and 
Head of the Advanced Materials Section. He has written widely, holds three 
patents, and has given numerous technical reports. Ron. 
Dr. Ronald A. DeMarco, Office of Naval Research: Thank you Admiral. It is a 
pleasure to be here as a scientist among legal and policy people. To borrow from 
Red Skeleton, my presentation is like a long-tailed cat in a room of rocking chairs. 
As Commander Quinn and I ftrst started talking about our assignment today we 
realized very quickly that we were talking past each other; we were not talking the 
same language and we do not mean the same things by what we say. So what I am 
going to do is provide a scientiftc perspective because there is a difference when 
you talk about the impact of naval operations on the environment from a scientiftc 
versus a legal or policy point of view. I deftne "effect" as the result of an action. If 
we try to put it in military terms, we can look at the "effect" as the tonnage of 
bombs dropped. But that does not tell us anything about the consequences. The 
"impact" is that the target is destroyed, the target is missed, or it is partially 
destroyed and it will be back on-line in one week. The distinction between "effect" 
and "impact" is fairly important from a scientiftc standpoint. What we tend to see 
in the policy area is many people using effect and calling it impact. This will be 
the context in which I use these terms. When you talk about impact you have to 
know more than just the effect, you have to know what the capability was before 
and what the capability is after. There are time considerations to factor in as well. 
You can have a short-term impact that is very minor but in the long-term can be 
catastrophic. It is like changing the flow of water in a river. In the short-term, the 
impact may be minor. But, in the long-term it may create erosion or establish 
different flow patterns for the river and as a result you may flood some areas and 
destroy crop growing capabilities. Conversely, something that looks like a 
short-term catastrophe, and I think oil spills are of that nature, are in the 
long-term, due to bacteria that grows in oil polluted areas, able to be remediated. 
In the longer term, maybe ten or ftfteen years, the impact may actually be very 
negligible. It can range from negative to beneftcial. From the beneftcial side, let 
us assume there was, for some reason, an excessive number of predators in some 
given species. So they are working very hard on the food chain below them and 
the chain can not survive. If by accident you happen to kill off some of the 
predators, you may actually have put the system in better balance than it was 
before. Whether an impact is negative or beneftcial is often decided from a value 
judgment perspective, and this is part of the problem with science. Science takes 
a long time to complete, to verify, and to conftrm, and often you do not have a long 
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time to wait to make decisions so it falls back on a value judgment. Society values 
life, society values other forms of life. There are differences in cultural values also. 
During the Gulf War, the Saudis wanted to protect their "RO" units, the 
reverse-osmosis water purification units, at the expense of other possibilities. So 
that was a value judgment on their part. 
Development of a sound environmental policy should consider the initial 
condition of the environment, the anticipated effect of the policy on the 
environment, the impact of that effect and the costlbenefit ratio of that impact. As 
I mentioned, to assess the impact of an action, you have to know the initial 
conditions of the environment. You have to know not only what your impact or 
effect might be, but what does nature itself do? Your impact may be relatively small 
compared to what nature normally does. What is the effect and what did you do 
to the environment? That becomes the "numbers" issue. Then comes the 
assessment of the impact and that is a very hard thing to do. It becomes a 
costlbenefit analysis and cost does not have to be measured in dollars. Cost can 
involve a variety of things. How do you assess the costlbenefit of the impact a policy 
decision may have? Assume you have a policy for tuna fishing, for example. 
Because you change the net size, fishermen may say they are going to catch fewer 
fish, therefore, there is an economic impact on them. You can calculate the number 
of dollars or training hours affected by a policy decision. You can say what those 
numbers are going to be, but what is the impact of those numbers on reduced 
training capabilities? In the military what you want to do is train as you fight, you 
do not want to train at half speed and then find yourself in a situation where you 
have to be at full speed and not be aware of what is happening and how things can 
change. So you can lose the edge there and you cannot put a dollar value on that. 
But there should be some type of an assessment of what the policy actually does, 
not only to the environment, but, from the military sense, to our military 
capability. 
I am going to provide three examples and go through them to try and give you 
an idea of actual situations. The Russians, the former-Soviet Union, released 
papers saying they sent radio-nuclides into some of their rivers; that they took 
some of their reactors from some of their ships and threw them into the Barents 
Sea. They say the reactors are down there and here is the amount of nuclear 
material that was in them and here is when it happened. What do you do? This 
stuff is leaking and we are now talking about it's "migration", which could get it 
into the rich fishing areas off the coast of Scandinavian countries. It could move 
considerable distances. What policy do you adopt? What action do you take? One 
thing that was done at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, using their computing 
capabilities, was to model what was going to happen to those materials. They 
calculated the high level waste that was dumped with those reactors, looked at the 
rivers that emptied into the Barents Sea, and then looked at the radioactive waste 
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that was dumped into the Irish Sea from the Sellafield nuclear power plant in the 
U.K. 
What they found was that the river releases from the former-Soviet Union, and 
the Sellafield releases from the U.K., basically accounted for all the nuclear activity 
that was in the water. If they were to calculate in the high level nuclear waste that 
was in the Soviet reactors, they should have had real numbers ten times higher 
than what they were seeing. So we were in a good-newslbad-news situation. You 
are not leaking the high level radiation material. That is the good news. The other 
part of the good news is that you are in a position to get monitoring out there and 
to be able to really watch what is happening. The bad news is that the high level 
nuclear waste is not leaking yet. What is the environmental impact of all this? We 
do not know. Are the nuclides that are present in the water up there in such dilute 
concentration that their chances of getting into the food chain are extremely small, 
negligible, zero? Or, are they there at a level that they might get into the food 
chain? That consequence has not been looked at but at least we know the effect at 
this point. 
The second situation I will address is the Gulf War oil spill. Six hundred plus 
million barrels of crude oil were dumped; six to eleven million, depending on your 
numbers, were released into the marine environment itself. The initial estimates 
were grim. It was believed that the oil slick would sink as the 1983 spill did, and 
if it did, it would cause catastrophic damage to sub-tidal organisms and there would 
be gross contamination of sub-tidal biological organisms. In actuality, that did not 
happen. There were physical, chemical, and biological reasons why it did not 
happen. The wind kept all the oil very close to the shores of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. Many of the organisms on the shoreline were very severely impacted, 
including aquatic birds and animals that bore into the ground, like frogs. Oil went 
into the holes and it sat there. It does not weather there because there is no 
weathering down in the caverns. So there were some very severe impacts along the 
shore, but not what was anticipated. We also witnessed extensive oil recovery 
operations. Even before the war was over, people were already trying to recover 
the oil. The numbers vary, but somewhere between 15 and 35 percent of the oil 
spill was actually scooped up and taken away; it was recovered. A large amount of 
the oil evaporated. It is very hot in the Gulf and you get more evaporation there 
than you would normally. The discharges that regularly occur in the Gulf due to 
tanker traffic did not happen nearly as much because there was not much tanker 
traffic. Nobody wanted to run into a mine. So the tankers tended to remain in port 
and that lessened the impact on the environment. The intense solar radiation and 
enhanced chemical reaction, as mentioned by Colonel Finch earlier, helped 
mitigate some of the problem. But, as was pointed out by the Colonel, we do not 
know the long-term effects. One of the comments made by the National Oceans 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was that the environment has changed 
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and we do not know if it will ever come back to the way it was-it may now be 
different. What they found, however, were unspoiled areas that continue to 
prosper. If you can clean up what is there on the shore, you may be all right, in 
terms of ultimate recovery. How long that will take we just do not know. We are 
probably looking at twenty years before we can get to that stage. 
My third situational example is one that is a little closer to the Navy's heart. 
Acoustic thermometry of ocean climate (A TO C). ATOC looks to see if the 
"greenhouse effect" and global warming is actually occurring. The way this is done 
is you send impulses of sound into the deep basins of the oceans over thousand of 
miles and you measure the speed of the sound through the water. The speed of 
sound is very sensitive to the temperature of the water, so if there has been a change 
in the deep basin water temperature, there is a good possibility of global warming 
having occurred. 
The problem is you have to use low frequency sound and there are 
environmental groups that have argued that if you use low frequency sound at 
these levels you are going to deafen marine mammals; you are going to cause 
physiological trauma to the marine mammal population; and all sort of negative 
things are going to happen. In actuality, the sound that would have been used 
would have been less than that emitted by a tanker. The number I have seen is one 
tenth the value of a large tanker. We send tankers back and forth across the oceans 
all the time. We have not seen any deafening of any marine mammals that we know 
of. So what has happened is that the experiment has been stopped. California has 
now issued a source permit for the ATOC experiment, so they can use California. 
Hawaii has not issued a source permit, so the experiment is still on hold. The 
National Research Council did a report in 1994, so we are not looking at dated 
information, and all the information and papers they were able to put together 
concluded that low frequency sound does not appear to be a problem for marine 
mammals. Although this report exists, the National Marine Fisheries Service has 
a 150 decibel (dB) source level proposed ruling that is being looked at right now. 
Large tankers exceed 150 dBs. The navigational equipment on most ships exceeds 
that. Many practical things exceed that number already. We have been able to do 
this without problems in the past; 150 dBs is not a scientifically based number. 
No information they have constitutes a basis for any regulatory action, and yet 
there it is. This is of interest to the Navy because we use low frequency sound, 
sonar experimentation and a variety of other things. A ship may have to get permits 
in order to exceed the 150 dB limit if that ruling goes through. 
Now, what do we know about marine mammal hearing? We will spend some 
time on this as this is important to the Navy. Most of the hearing tests that have 
been done with a variety of species of seals are generally stopped at a kHz. We have 
to go lower than one kHz. We have determined that when you get down less than 
1000 Hz you have to increase the volume to at least 125 or 135 dB before the animal 
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is able to hear it. Now hearing something and being harmed by that level of sound 
are two different things. Suppose my kids have their music on too loud. I can put 
a filter on it by shutting the door; I can turn it down; or, I can go away. But, if! 
was a marine mammal, I would have been "taken" because I would have been 
affected by that music. We are trying to understand the physiology and the hearing 
of marine mammals such as the Bottle-nosed porpoise. We have conducted hearing 
"tests" on individual porpoises over a period of fifteen years and have learned that 
they experience hearing loss as they age just as do humans. As an example, one 
porpoise could hear sound at 50 Hz at 50 dBs. Fifteen years later, that same animal 
had about 50 percent hearing at probably 60 or 70 Hz, but it required a power 
source of about 140 dBs for it to do so. What we are finding is that among marine 
mammals, hearing is naturally lost just like our hearing is naturally lost. That 
being true, how can we now assess what the impact of acoustics is on any particular 
marine mammal if we do not know the age of the particular animal and what his 
previous hearing was? 
We are also assessing the effect of low frequency sound on marine mammals. 
We have patterns of marine mammals diving, climbing, diving and climbing in 
the ocean. As the animal dives its respiratory rate and heart beat becomes very 
slow, and as it comes back up they increase again. If you introduced a sound at 
that point and saw a change in the animal's heart beat or respiratory rate, you might 
say it has been affected. We have done the same thing by determining whether an 
inputted low frequency sound affects the sounds Finback whales use to 
communicate with each other. Finback whales speak in dialect. Those in waters 
off California, the "southerners", have a bit more ofa drawl than do Finbacks off 
of Greenland and northern Europe. If you did not know they spoke in dialect, and 
were used to hearing a drawl and suddenly, in a different area, you do not hear that 
drawl, you might decide that Finbacks have been impacted. You might decide 
there is a danger, that something is wrong. But, nothing is wrong. It is just that 
Finback whales speak differently. The point is that you cannot make valid 
environmental policy decisions without first understanding the environment or 
the species that you are concerned about. 
Let me return again to the process-the components of the environmental 
policy process. We began with mechanisms that produce environmental "effects". 
These may be military operations, nonmilitary operations and activities, or natural 
events that occur. Each of these generate some sort of effect. That effect can impact 
the security of the nation which then would trigger activity in the political system 
and could have political consequences. The effect could impact the physical 
environment and have consequences for ecological systems. Or, the effect could 
have its impact in the economic environment with consequences for the social 
system of the nation. Therefore, an impact assessment should be made that 
involves all of these parts of the puzzle. What we are seeking is a proper balance. 
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There has to be a balance. What happens is that environmental policy decisions 
may not be balanced. An example of that is the way the Navy shock tests its ships. 
You want to ensure that the integrity of the ship and its systems are properly 
protected from shock transmitted through the water column. But you are also 
concerned for the safety of marine mammals if they get too close to the test site. 
Laissez faiTe-shock test any place you want, or ultra restrictions-you cannot 
shock test at all. What the Navy does is take a balanced approach. We put spotters 
in planes and on surface craft. We have floating and fixed listening devices to listen 
for any marine mammals in a wide radius around the test site. If none are located, 
we do the test. If marine mammals are detected, the test will be delayed until they 
leave the area. So that is an illustration of the balancing that can occur to meet 
everyone's objectives. But, you really have to watch to ensure that the proper 
balance is maintained. If it tilts too much one way or the other a compensating 
change in the policy and regulations may be required to bring it back in line again. 
If policy-makers want to look at new policy, they really ought to do so in terms of 
the entire assessment and the ability to balance the benefits and the costs with the 
policy that is generated. Thank you. 
Vice Admiral Doyle,Jr.: Thank you Ron. Our next speaker is Mr. William Arkin. 
Bill is a columnist, an author, and a consultant specializing in modern warfare, 
nuclear weapons, arms control, and the environment. You name it and he has 
written about it. Bill was Director of Military Research for Greenpeace 
International and co-author of a book on modern warfare and the environment in 
the Gulf War. He presently has a Macarthur Foundation Grant for looking at the 
destruction of electrical generating facilities in warfare. He is also working with 
Greenpeace International on the general subject of denuclearization of the world's 
oceans. Bill. 
Mr. William M. Arkin: First, I should say as the initial person speaking at this 
conference who does not work for the U.S. Government that what I am about to 
say is very critical of the US Government. Because of that, I should declare at the 
outset that I believe that environmental protection is adequate in warfare, but I do 
not think it is because of the law. I think it is because of our culture or ethic. The 
problem as I see it is that lawyers and military operators do not want to codify too 
many constraints. There is a cultural reality that much of what occurs during war 
is obviously secret; a reality that is used by some to deflect public opinion and to 
avoid outside intervention or control. When I say "outside", I mean the Air Force 
avoiding outside intervention and control perhaps even from another Service, or 
vice versa. I say that environmental protection is adequate because, to some degree, 
when I heard the presentation in the previous panel I expected examples to be 
given by the operators of cases where they felt that they could not conduct certain 
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military operations during warfare because of environmental restrictions and I did 
not hear any examples come up. There is a presumption, somehow, that 
environmental regulations and law do restrict operations or that in some way the 
lives of soldiers and sailors has to be balanced against environmental protection 
and I believe that dichotomy is false. In fact, the conduct of good military 
operations, and here again I refer to the United States, are not at odds with 
environmental protection. And, in fact, the conduct of bad military operations, 
that is, operations that are done to avoid domestic environmental regulation or 
international regulation, but are done in secret, ultimately are more detrimental 
to the enforcement of international law. That is the basis of my paper. I look at a 
number of examples in which actual practices during the Gulf War contradicted 
or violated the legal obligations of the United States but because they were done 
in secret, or because they did not receive as much attention as what the Iraqis did, 
they are not "lessons to be learned," so to speak. In my paper, I argue that in spite 
of the absence of any war crimes being prosecuted against Iraq for its gross 
violations, in spite of the focus away from the Gulf upon the extinguishment of 
the last oil fires in November of 1991, and in spite of no new laws being 
promulgated as a result of the Gulf War (no new Geneva protocols), environmental 
protection has advanced. I examine some limited examples from the Gulf War that 
I think are applicable to future military operations. First, on a micro-level, I look 
at the use of certain weapons which I classify as "controversial" weapons. I classify 
them as "controversial" weapons because none of them are illegal, and here I refer 
to napalm, fuel-air explosives, cluster bombs, and depleted uranium ammunition. 
For whatever reason, we read about them in newspapers all the time. When the 
Ecuadorians and the Peruvians have a little spat, the Ecuadorian press is filled 
with articles saying the Peruvians are using napalm or when the press goes into 
Chechnya, the locals say the Russians use cluster bombs. No one really quite knows 
why they are referring to these weapons, as opposed to other weapons. Why does 
the news media report that napalm, or fuel-air explosives, or cluster bombs are 
used as opposed to just good old fashion other kinds of weapons which do similar 
or worse damage? I am not sure I have a clear answer other than that there seems 
to be an ethic of understanding of the repugnance of certain types of weapons. 
Whether you believe that the ones that I have mentioned are in that category or 
not is irrelevant. As General Linhard said this morning, the use of cluster bombs 
in the Vietnam War, in terms of going after triple-A on dikes, actually can be 
demonstrated as being a much less destructive means than resort to other, 
non-controversial bombs that might breach the dike. Cluster bombs used in urban 
attacks might be considered a more destructive means because of the high dud 
rate. Undetonated sub-munitions become virtual mines that have an adverse 
impact on the civilian population. Depleted uranium is clearly a superior tank 
killer to tungsten. It is cheaper; it is more efficient. Nevertheless, there is a residual 
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environmental effect from the use of depleted uranium that has now been 
demonstrated in the Gulf War and it seems that that classifies it as a controversial 
weapon. On the micro-level, after I look at certain types of weapons, my paper looks 
at the bombing of certain types of targets and here I look at two in particular, dams 
and oil tankers. In the case of dams, the United States and the Coalition did not attack 
any dams in the Gulf War. There were some suggestions early on by the Air Force 
that dams be considered as potential targets in response to Iraqi use of -chemical 
weapons as a punitive measure, and three dams were identified by 
"Checkmate"-Headquarters, USAF Air Staff Planning Group-that would, if 
struck, have the most adverse civilian effect. They were chosen specifically for that 
purpose. However, legally they were scrubbed and that proposal was rejected at 
the policy level. As the war plan developed, and as the war was prosecuted, 
hydropower stations co-located at dams were looked at very closely in terms of the 
implications of striking those hydropower stations given the potential collateral 
damage to dams that might result. The conclusions being that there were methods 
that were tried and true from Vietnam for attacking those hydropower stations by 
the aircraft flying parallel to the dam wall, and by the use of precision guided 
weapons, which would minimize the danger to the dam, therefore hydropower 
stations were allowed to be hit. Having said all of that, according to the declassified 
Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System GULLS) of U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), the CENTCOM lawyers argued that in the future the U.S. Air Force 
should bomb dams because if we do not we are going to lose that possibility through 
some airtight legal restriction. Therefore, dams should be a part of target lists in future 
operations. 
The second target I address in my paper is oil tankers and here the issue oflaw, 
of rules of engagement, listening to General Linhard speak earlier today, comes 
into full force. There were intense shouting matches between Admiral Arthur and 
General Schwartzkopf about the legitimacy of targeting tankers. The Navy 
attacked an Iraqi tanker on the 19th of January and sank it, causing a significant 
spill. That was a 72,000 ton tanker, one of Iraq's largest, presumed to be almost 
full of oil. Admiral Arthur argued to General Schwartzkopf why is not a tanker as 
legitimate a target as a dam or electrical power plants that you are hitting in Iraq. 
General Schwartzkopf argued to Admiral Arthur, "I do not give a [expletive 
deleted] what you think about whether electrical power plants or oil tankers are 
lawful targets, I say they are not going to be hit and that is what the rules of 
engagement say." Now I have interviewed the principals involved, and I have also 
interviewed the JAGs, and the JAGs all say the same thing, "Well, we do not know 
whatthey discussed." So when it comes to really ticklish questions of whatto target 
and under what circumstances, often times they are resolved at very high levels 
with not much legal scrubbing, and without much legal consideration. But still I 
conclude that despite the fact the Navy had a very different interpretation of the 
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rules of engagement than did the CENTCOM staff, and despite the fact that one 
tanker was hit and then the operation ceased until later in the war when, after the 
Iraqis started spilling oil, the ROE were changed and Iraqi tankers were again hit, 
it appears that.when you talk about "the rules", they are really important. "The 
rules" as codified, are really important because at the decision-making level there 
is a lot of leeway as to what can and cannot be hit. So today we have talked a lot 
about "commanders," like we were talking about a commander on a ship or a 
captain in a platoon and what a company might be doing, but, in fact, commanders 
are also four-star generals and admirals who have at their disposal far more 
destructive means of attack. 
I should also say that one of our Coalition partners, the French, attacked tankers 
in the Gulf War as well, and they bombed Iraqi tankers moored at the Port of Al 
Ahmadi in Kuwait and two days later the Iraqis started to expel oil into the Gulf 
from that port. Now is there a cause and effect? I do not know, but why do we not 
know that the French attacked a tanker at the Port of Al Ahmadi? Because it is 
secret, because in order to not criticize a Coalition partner who did not follow the 
rules of engagement, they just decided to sweep it under the rug. I discuss at the 
end of the paper my perception ofIraqi views as a result of my trips to Iraq. 
At the macro-level, I talk about what I call the "reverberations of military 
operations" to expand our defmition of collateral damage. And here I look at 
remnants of war which Colonel Finch described in terms of the horrificland mine 
problem that we are facing worldwide. In the Gulf War, I do not need to tell you 
that the remnants question was enormous. It just so happens that when you have 
1.2 million soldiers and 14,000 armored vehicles on a battlefield, they leave behind 
a lot of garbage. It is just unavoidable. Nevertheless, a lot of that remnant is toxic 
and some of it is explosive. The Gulf War saw the largest use of cluster bombs in 
the history of warfare, some 60,000 cluster bombs dropped from the air, or 
approximately one third of the munitions dropped from the air. It is estimated, 
with a conservative figure of 3%-5% duds, that somewhere around 2.7 million 
bomblets from cluster bombs were left behind. That is approximately the same 
number of mines that were left behind in Kuwait. 
In my paper I talk about the remnants of war in the context of the "toxicity of 
the modern battlefield" and I use the term "toxicity of the modern battlefield" 
because of the latest view of the "Gulf War syndrome", and I say the latest view 
because maybe next week's view will be different. It is a kind of soup, if you will, 
a toxic soup. The common thread which seems to run between these syndromes, 
and there are more than one, is that most of the soldiers who are showing these 
symptoms were exposed to a variety of substances, including vaccines and chemical 
antidotes, as well as other highly toxic materials. One of the substances that the 
National Science Foundation pointed to in their report, as did the Rockefeller 
University in their report, was paint. I am a former Army guy and as any of you 
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who are former Army guys know, when you paint tanks or Army vehicles, it is 
done in an airtight environment with tremendous attention paid to human 
exposure because of the high toxicity of anti-reflective camouflage paint. In the 
Gulf War a lot of expedients were used in order to do this same thing. It is not 
coincidental, therefore, that many of the people who have been exposed to "Gulf 
War syndrome" are from supply and services units, as opposed to those who were 
in combat units, because those in supply and service units tend to be exposed to 
more toxic materials. I am talking about the whole gamut, from lubricants, to 
paints, to solvents, etc. Now, you may think thatthe "Gulf War syndrome" is pretty 
far afield, but I do not think you can pick up many newspapers in a week's time 
in America and not read one or two articles about "Gulf War syndrome." It seems 
to have evoked enormous emotional energy on the part of veterans and has 
collected a combination of former POW/MIA activists, UFO activists, antiwar 
activists, and environmentalists. Actually, the environmentalists seem to stay away 
from the Gulf War syndrome issue because it has to do with the military, and they 
hate the military. Nevertheless, the reverberations, the unknowns, the 
combination of factors, is what is interesting about the "Gulf War syndrome." 
When we talk about "long-lasting" and "long-term," we are talking about 
decades. So even what Mr. Harper said this morning, about how we are going to 
determine what the environmental effect of Operation Desert Storm was by 1997, 
is absurd. We are just now beginning to see Kuwait's data about the health effects 
of the war, just now. Kuwait had a conference in December 1994, where it first 
began to reveal some resultant health statistics-respiratory diseases up 50 
percent, child and infant mortality up something like 25 percent from prewar 
levels. Are these attributable to the environmental decay that occurred in the Gulf 
War? We do not know, and we are not going to know for some time. 
Reverberations to me are also important because it is a new fad within the U.S. 
military; this fad called information warfare. I think the Air Force calls it "parallel 
warfare" and I heard General Linhard refer to it this morning as "strategic 
paralysis." Everybody has a term for it now. Information warfare is systemic 
warfare, if you will, an attempt to conduct military operations so as to have a 
systemic effect on the enemy. The idea is that our societies are becoming so tightly 
inter-woven and interconnected; that communications and electronics and 
electricity are so tightly inter-woven, that to disrupt those aspects of society is to 
have a greater military effect than actual physical destruction. You see this coming 
out of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base. You see this coming out of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy - 30 aCSMOP-30). You see it coming 
out of the Information Warfare School at the National Defense University. This 
theory, the thinking, about reverberation and the interconnectedness of society, I 
find useful and interesting because in the Gulf War the actual prosecution of that 
conflict was done with the intent of having that reverberative effect. And here I 
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refer to the bombing of electricity, the bombing of the national electrical grid in 
Iraq to have a military effect. The fact of the matter is that you cannot show that 
it had any military effect. The Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded that it is not 
possible to demonstrate that the destruction ofIraqi electricity had any impact on 
command and control, or air defenses, or chemical or biological weapons. It had 
a presumed effect but not a proven effect. A recent article in the Journal of Strategic 
Studies by Dan Kuehl, who is a professor at the National War College and who 
was a member of "Checkmate" during the Gulf War, concludes that neither in 
Vietnam, Korea, nor in the Gulf War can one conclude that the destruction of 
electricity had any effect. But what was the reverberating effect on the civilian 
population? 
The reverberating effect was that some of the very targets which were proscribed 
by international law , some of the very targets which the rules of engagements stated 
could not be attacked-water being the particular one-were effected. As they 
found on 18 January, the day after the flrst day of bombing, all ofa sudden CNN 
was reporting that the water was off in the hotel. And I have anecdotes of guys 
sitting in "Checkmate" in the Pentagon running around saying, "Did you think 
that the water was going to go off?" And, they said, "[Expletive deleted], we never 
thought that the water was going to go off." But, all of a sudden, they found that 
by the systemic attack on electricity, water distribution, water puriflcation, and 
sewage treatment were similarly effected. So a target which was not physically 
attacked was disabled by the destruction of electricity. 
The impact on the civilian population is, of course, in dispute. Most 
demographers argue that from 1991 to 1994, 140,000 Iraqi's died in excess ofthe 
number that would have died under normal demographic conditions-140,000 
people. Now the Air Force argues this flgure is not attributable to electricity. It is 
attributable to sanctions; it is attributable to the [expletive deleted] life in Iraq; it 
is attributable to the lack offood; and it is attributable to war damage. But, if we 
are talking about environmental destruction; if we are talking about any sensible 
reason why you restrict environmental destruction, it is because of the effect that 
that environmental destruction has on people. And, as I sat here as a true-blue 
tree-hugger, listening to the two previous presentations about the need to protect 
marine mammals and endangered species, and all that, I saw a lot of chuckling in 
the room, and I join you. But the fact of the matter is that environmental protection 
is about the sustainment of human life, and that may relate to preserving 
bio-diversity, and preserving an ecological balance, and preserving the natural 
environment in a state which will sustain human life. But, when we make an 
evaluation of the environmental effect of warfare, when we talk about the 
environmental impact, we have to ask what was the environmental impact of the 
oil flres in Kuwait? What did it do to the Kuwait people? What did it do to their 
ability to sustain their life in the long-term? And here, ironically, I would have to 
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say that other than the spotty health statistics which we are just beginning to see, 
the answer is "not very much." Kuwait is now producing oil at a level of 
approximately 70 percent of what it was producing pre-war and because of many 
of the factors that Ron DeMarco described in his presentation, the oil spills seemed 
to have been mitigated-certainly not to the levels that would have been required 
in the Exxon Valdez or the Amoco Cadiz. But, CNN is not there any more; so we 
do not have to look at it. The Kuwaiti and Saudi interpretations of the level of 
environmental remediation that is required is different than ours. They are willing 
to live in that environment, but live they cannot. 
Now we heard a lot this morning about the Iraqis this and the Iraqis that. I 
spent a couple of months in Iraq since the war, on three trips, as a part of the 
Harvard Study Team. In August 1991, I was there for a month and in 1993, I was 
there for a month. I had an opportunity to talk to Iraqis and to interview them and 
to ask them "why." I seemed to have gotten three both direct and elliptical 
responses. The first thing that all Iraqis say is, "What we did is no worse than what 
you did." So I say, "What did we do?" And they say, "You bombed nuclear power 
plants. You bombed chemical weapons facilities. You bombed irrigation barrages. 
You bombed bridges. You bombed urban areas. You used fuel-air explosives and 
you used napalm." All of the things that you read in the news, the Iraqis read it as 
well. So when the New York Times printed an article that said depleted uranium 
is a problem in Iraq, the Iraqis said depleted uranium is a problem. When I asked 
them how do you know epidemiologically that it is a problem their answer was, 
"We read it in the New York Times." They could not produce evidence of higher 
incidence of cancer; they could not show that there was even any diagnostic effect, 
but there was a presumption. 
Second, there are sufficient documents now that have been released, Iraqi 
documents, captured in the Gulf War, that conclusively show that the intent of 
Iraq's destruction of the oil wells was vindictive and had no military purpose 
whatsoever. I have them in my possession. When I hear you folks, U.S. government 
lawyers, argue that the Iraqi destruction of the oil wells in Kuwait had some 
military effect, or that it had a presumed military value, I just am stunned. The 
documentation is there. The Defence Intelligence Agency has in its hands Iraqi 
documents that show that in the second week of August 1990, less than a week 
after invading Kuwait, the Iraqis began to wire together the oil wells to explode 
them as a totally vindictive measure if they were expelled from Kuwait early. The 
documents are there, the Iraqi documents are available and yet for some reason, 
which I do not fathom or understand, in the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War 
report, the Title V report, and in the presentation by General Linhard this 
morning, there is this hint that perhaps what Iraq did was justified, and here I will 
get back to effect and impact. It may have had some military effect but to argue 
that that was the intent behind what Iraq did is really grotesque. When I have 
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shown those documents to Iraqi officials, their answer is, "What the military does 
is not what the Government does." 
Number three. What all Iraqis seem to say is that the things that they did had 
an environmental impact and were extraordinary but that they were "necessitated 
by the situation." I asked, "How does that comport with your acknowledgement 
that destroying the oil wells was not done to complicate the targeting of your 
forces?" What does "necessitated by the situation" mean? And their answer was, 
"Our military operation was to destroy Kuwait. Therefore, we destroyed the wells 
because that was what our military operation was." Is that a violation of 
international law? Yes. But did they see it as being a part of their military 
operation? Yes. That is what they were directed to do. If they were forced to 
evacuate from Kuwait, their mission was to destroy the infrastructure. 
Next, for those of you who question whether others recognize international law 
or understand it, I think the Iraqi case is also interesting and instructive. Whether 
you believe that CNN was a stooge in the Gulf War, or believe that the news media 
did the Iraqi's propaganda for them, the fact is that on 21 January 1991, when the 
Iraqis took Peter Arnett to Dour, a village in northern Iraq that was flattened by 
a B52 bombing attack and was first revealed on TV, or when the Iraqis took Peter 
Arnett to the baby milk factory, or to the Mosque, or to this place, or that place, 
they knew enough to distinguish that those were the places that suffered collateral 
damage. The Iraqis never took CNN to military targets, including electrical power 
plants. They never took CNN to oil refineries. They never took CNN to 
government ministries in Baghdad. They took them to the places that anyone who 
has half a brain, who is not just blinded by thinking the Iraqis are all liars and 
therefore should be ignored, would accept as cases oflegitimate collateral damage. 
Now the U.S., of course, had an explanation for each case. Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates that the Iraqis understood what they were doing; they understood 
the cases. And similarly, consider the acts of perfidy that Iraq perpetuated in the 
war, such as the case where they created false damage, and the case where they 
reversed their tank turrets. When I ask the legal people in the Iraqi foreign ministry 
about them, they pulled out their International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) manuals and showed me how those cases were legal. They argued that these 
were not acts of perfidy; that it is not established in international law that you 
cannot turn your tank turrets around. When I asked why they turned their tank 
turrets around they responded, "Because they feared U.S. lasers were going to be 
directed at the range finders on their tanks and, therefore, that they did not want 
to have their optical systems facing forward toward the U.S. forces. 
What do I conclude from all ofthis? Well, in my paper I point to all ofthese 
controversial weapons and controversial practices and the political constraints, 
either because of public opinion or because of internal pressure, that seems to have 
been brought to bear in each case. To conclude, I generally agree with the Mr. 
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Harper; the law seems sufficient. The basic rules ofproportionality and the overlap 
of these various measures seems sufficient. Does that address Mr. Harper's own 
argument that enforcement is the problem, when we are the ones that have failed 
to enforce the law when others broke them? The answer is no. But when the true 
record of the Gulf War is looked at, when the true examples that challenge 
international law are looked at, it seems to me that we come up with a very different 
conclusion. Thank you very much. 
Vice Admiral Doyle, Jr.: Thank you Bill, for that very provocative and insightful 
presentation. I told you he would talk about anything. It is my pleasure to now 
introduce the commentator for our panel, Dr. Arthur Gaines. Arthur is a Research 
Specialist with the Marine Policy Center at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. 
He conducts research on ocean economics, law, policy, and management. He is the 
author of several papers on biochemistry and estuaries in the coastal ocean. Arthur. 
Dr. Arthur G. Gaines, Jr., Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute: Thank you 
Admiral Doyle. I would like to start by telling you something about myself and 
my own viewpoint. My background is in the environmental sciences and 
oceanography. I am interested in how scientific information can be brought to 
bear on making better decisions. At the same time, I would call myself an 
environmentalist. I give more money than I like to think about to environmental 
groups, principally land preservation groups and environmental education groups. 
I find that the professional end of what I do is very often at conflict with these 
sentiments and often puts me on the opposite side of the table from people who 
call themselves environmentalists. I see a number of inconsistencies among 
so-called environmentalists or people who espouse environmental concerns that 
make me feel that, in a way, they are their own worst enemy. For example, everyone 
is concerned about oil spills, but when was an environmental impact statement 
performed on the use of asphalt all over the world for paving roads? That is a lot 
of oil. If people see oil on the beach, it is a crisis. But what about all the roads that 
are made of oil? What about farming? What about an environmental impact 
statement on farming? Farming is one of the most destructive environmental 
activities around. The entire bio-diversity of farm land, in essence, is reduced to 
one species. Wheat, rice, whatever is growing. The use of pesticides is very 
damaging to normal insects and organisms that would inhabit a farmed area. The 
use of nutrients has a very widespread impact on the quality of drinking water, the 
water quality of adjacent ponds, the receiving waters, rivers, and so forth. There 
are places in the American West, in the farm belt, where the ground water 
concentration of nitrite fertilizer is sixty parts per million. That is six times greater 
than the drinking water standard permitted by the Environmental Protection 
Agency. Yet you do not hear people saying farming is an environmental problem. 
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Before I get into the substance of my comments, I would like to point out that 
people feel that environmental protection is consistent with the best human 
interest, while I would say that they are often at odds. Farming is not consistent 
with the best environmental concerns. Farming destroys the environment. People, 
especially environmentalists, but everyone to a certain extent, have a feeling that 
nature is peaceful and that we should seek to emulate nature for peace and 
harmony. I took a course in parasitology years ago in college and the quote in the 
front of that book by the author, Chandler, was that we think of nature as peaceful 
and we seek to emulate it, yet in every meadow, in every stream, under every rock, 
in every creek, there is murder, destruction, and suffering going on all the time. I 
think that is a more balanced view than the idea that nature is very peaceful. That 
concludes my introductory comments. Maybe you will see where I am coming 
from. 
Secondly, I would like to tell you something about the institution I represent 
because I do not ordinarily meet with a group like this and I thank Professor 
Grunawalt for inviting me. Before I begin, I would like to congratulate the panel 
on their very interesting papers. Every one of them was interesting and, in fact, I 
have noticed in the course of the day, that there is really very little distinct 
disagreement among them. I hear people falling in different places on the 
spectrum, but other than the outcome of the Ottawa Conference, I do not see any 
distinct disagreements. One of the advantages for someone like me to be here is 
that it provides an opportunity to get to know some of you and the organizations 
you are with, and vice versa. 
I am with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Most of you who know 
of the Institute think of it in terms of basic ocean research. Our organization 
obviously has an administrative layer that provides administrative services, that 
operates our ships and submersibles, and that administers research, and so forth. 
The level at which research and creativity are accomplished, and the level at which 
proposals are written and sent out, is the next layer down. This second layer 
consists of 250 people, approximately, who do work in physical oceanography, 
biology, chemistry, geology, and ocean engineering. We have a third layer with 
Centers, which tends to bring those disciplines together again in interdisciplinary 
kinds of work. I am with the Marine Policy Center. At the present, we consider 
ourselves as sort of the "proto-department". We may become the sixth department 
at the Institution at some point. The Marine Policy Center, unlike all of the other 
departments that deal with earth sciences and engineering, incorporates the 
disciplines of law, economics, policy analysis, science and technology, and we 
conduct work on the law of the sea among other topics. My own background is in 
biology, geology, and oceanography. My work focuses on how marine science and 
technology bears on the decision-making process for use of the environment, for 
use of the ocean, and for its protection. 
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My terminology in some of these discussions of military matters could be way 
off because I am not use to talking about these things. If it is, I will my correct 
paper for the published version. To evaluate the environmental impact of military 
systems, of having a military, one needs to consider the whole thing, in essence, 
from the beginning to the end. I see really two separate categories of environmental 
impact. One of them is associated with military preparedness, which involves all 
of the industrial support, research and development, production, transportation, 
storage, and so forth, associated with providing the military with the wherewithal 
to defend the nation, and it consists of non-warlike military operations. This would 
include training camps, operation ofbases, storage of ordnance, training, and also, 
activation and deployment of forces. It does not involve any armed conflict. This 
category of military activity is typically conducted in a climate where, since there 
are no casualties, no one is upset, where there is generally more clear thinking. 
There can be a state of what you might call-efficiency. Materials are used 
efficiently and carefully, compared to what it might be under other circumstances. 
What I am saying is that environmental preservation, environmental regulation, 
and environmental protection are all consistent with this activity. There is no 
reason to believe that it is not possible to be responsive to these constraints. From 
what our military speakers here have said, the comments that I have heard today 
on that military preparedness side, we can talk reasonably about environmental 
protection in association with military activities. But, consider military activity 
that involves armed conflict. Under conditions of armed conflict, the stable mode 
I would propose is one of maximizing power. Even in the case of limited armed 
conflict, you would still see a tendency to maximize the delivery of force and power 
within the boundaries of the limits imposed by law and policy. Under those 
circumstances there are casualties, there are more likely to be accidents, things are 
likely to happen fast, decisions need to be made quickly, alternatives evaluated, 
and so forth. Nevertheless, in the case oflimited armed warfare, the conflict is still 
limited. There is rational thought, and to some extent, but perhaps not as great as 
in the military-preparedness side of the equation, environmental protection can 
be a reality. I think what we have heard today confirms that it is a reality under 
those circumstances. Now, when we speak of unlimited armed conflict, what I call, 
total warfare or strategic scale conflict, in which we are talking about employment 
ofintercontinental ballistic missiles, hundred megaton scale nuclear weapons, and 
the like, in that context we can no longer talk about environmental protection. If 
the situation gets to that level, there is no discussion of protecting the 
environment. It no longer makes any sense. 
We have not heard too much today about the environmental impact of the 
industrial military support infrastructure, and I am not going to try to do it myself. 
The whole nuclear fuel cycle is one which we have discovered has fundamental 
environmental significance-the storage of waste products, their transport, 
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reprocessing, accidents, and so forth. With respect to weapons development 
strategy, research and development of some weapons seems to be completely 
inconsistent with the idea of minimizing adverse environmental impacts. For 
example, one oU ohn Craven's examples is the low altitude nuclear ballistic missile. 
It is, in essence, an unshielded nuclear reactor carried in a cruise missile that lays 
down a lethal 500 rad swath of radiation beneath it as it cruises for months at a 
speed of Mach 3.5. Now that weapon could not even be tested without having a 
hideous environmental impact. According to John Craven, apparently it has been 
developed, and there is one in a lead crypt somewhere. My point is that important 
decisions need to be made about research and development of weaponry which 
will have significant environmental impact. 
Military operations which do not involve armed conflict, including training, 
readiness, and deployment, as well as the operation of military bases, have not, in 
the past, been conducted in ways that are always concerned with environmental 
impact, although we are improving in" this area. Similarly, the activation and 
deployment of forces is often associated with an increase in environmental 
accidents, as I mentioned earlier. Here too, military activity could be made more 
amenable to environmental protective measures. 
The ground water plume at Otis Air Force Base on Cape Cod is an example of 
a problem that started during the early part of World War II when Camp Edwards 
was used as a staging area to deploy troops. Hydrocarbons, nutrients, and other 
materials were dumped into the ground. The resulting plume is 11,000 feet long 
and has closed down one of the wells of the town of Falmouth. This is a problem 
that in the future we do not need to have. I am not inclined to go back and point 
fingers for something that happened fifty years ago; I do not think that is 
appropriate in any way, but we do not need that to happen in the future. 
Finally, with respect to limited armed conflict, there are at least three areas 
where there can be mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. One is in target 
selection. As an example, presumably you would not want to hit an active 
plutonium plant given the grave potential danger that the release of plutonium 
would have on the civilian population. There are other legitimate military targets 
that you would not want to hit as an environmental measure. Whether you did or 
not would depend on what the pros and cons were, the military advantages, and 
environmental disadvantages, and I think that there is room there for 
environmental concern. Such targets might include electrical grids, water systems, 
sewage treatment plants, transportation networks, communication facilities, and 
so forth. Whether you hit them or not may be a matter of debate, but there could 
be some environmental concerns expressed there. Civilian targets, such as the 
Bhopal-kind offertilizerproduction plant, may best not be hit if you are concerned 
about the environmental consequences of doing so. 
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There are tactical methodologies that I have heard discussed here today that 
can avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact. For example, the capture 
of an oil tanker instead of its destruction. If it is possible to capture or disable it 
instead of sinking it, that has presumably a significant environmental 
consequence. A civilian population could be demoralized by information, rather 
than by destroying their city, possibly. Use of weapons that are not likely to have 
large collateral effect is a similar methodology that we have heard a lot about today. 
In terms of specific weaponry used in armed conflict, we should. consider the 
longevity of their environmental impact when evaluating the desirability of their 
employment. I would add remediation as a further consideration, which Mr. Arkin 
also mentioned. We should ask ourselves, "How easy will it be to clean up this 
situation? How easy will it be to prevent ongoing impacts?" 
I am supposed to know something about environmental impacts and I have 
only pessimism to transmit to you today on that issue. When we think about this 
subject we should recognize that there are hierarchies of organization in the 
environment, the ecosystem being the largest. Habitats taken together, make up 
ecosystems and within each habitat are various communities, which, in turn, are 
assemblages of different kinds, different populations of organisms. A population 
is an assemblage of the same kind of species and so forth going down to the gene. 
Acute environmental impacts, those in essence that involve very quick death, are 
the only category ofimpacts in all of those systems that we have any kind of handle 
on. We use measures as LD-50, lethal dose 50. If you add different amounts of 
chemicals or toxicant, or you change the temperature in increments, at what point 
do you see death of the adult or death of the juvenile or collapse and loss of the 
community, and so forth. There is some hope in understanding acute impacts and 
having something to say about them. But, when it comes to chronic impacts 
involving increased susceptibility to disease or impaired feeding or impaired 
competitive ability of a species as a result of something that has happened, these 
are very difficult, if not impossible, to predict. They may take months or years or 
decades to express themselves in any particular case. Take, for example, the decline 
of coral reefs. No one kncws why coral reefs in some areas are declining. This 
decline is not sudden, it has happened over a period of decades. 
Another way to gain some perspective on all of this, and to understand the 
resilience ofindividual organisms and communities, is to look at natural disasters. 
Obviously, natural disasters have been happening for hundreds of millions of 
years. And obviously, people have little or nothing to do with any of them, except 
possibly fire. What I have tried to do in my paper is say something about the 
frequency with which natural disasters occur, the area that might be affected by 
them, and something about the longevity of their impacts. I make a totally gut 
impact assessment using an arbitrary scale of one to ten, where one is a very small 
impact and ten is certain major destruction. As an example, at least every few 
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months some place is hit by lightning. An individual lightning strike would affect, 
generally, a small area. You could be very close to a bolt oflightning and you would 
not be affected. The longevity of the adverse environmental impact of a lightning 
strike might be as long as one year. Maybe you could see where lightning struck 
or split a tree or destroyed a house a year later. It's immediate impact could be 
either very little or it could kill people. Conversely, tornadoes are very severe 
natural events that may have a war-like impact. Certainly volcanoes do. In the 
Galapagos Islands, volcanoes have spewed molten lava over 100 square miles of 
land. Now if you have hundreds of square miles ofland buried in burning lava you 
could have a very serious impact on birds and tortoises, and so forth. Earthquakes 
may cause widespread loss of life, as did the recent Japanese earthquakes. The 
destruction in San Francisco, California resulting from the earthquake of 1989, 
involved major losses in civic infrastructure. Floods can be equally devastating. 
The hurricane now battering the Virgin Islands also has a war-like impact. A 
meteor impact may have a huge impact on the natural environment with 
nuclear-like consequences, that is a nuclear winter-like scenario, darkness, dust, 
loss of huge populations of species throughout the world. The longevity of the 
meteor impact that killed off the dinosaurs a hundred million years ago is still 
here. Mankind probably would not be here if that meteor had not hit. We are still 
living with that impact. I would say that nuclear war, total war, would have an 
impact like that meteor impact. The point of this is that if we look at the range of 
natural disasters, it does not provide rational arguments against warfare. The range 
of natural disasters is about as bad as warfare. Yet, natural systems recover from 
fire, flood, hurricanes, and so forth. When you destroy a dam, what you are really 
doing is turning a situation back to what it use to be. Destruction of dams is said 
to be environmentally destructive, but building the dam in the first place was 
environmentally destructive because it drowned everything in the upstream 
valley. Destroying the dam returns the valley to what it use to be, although it has 
horrible short-term consequences for people. 
One final point. The direction of environmental concerns and environmental 
doctrine around the world is getting increasingly stringent and will have an 
increasing impact on the military. The nebulous concern with environmental 
protection that we see now is almost nothing compared to what is coming. 
Let us look for a moment at the "precautionary principle" of Agenda 21. In its 
most stringent wording it turns around the concept of the environmental impact 
statement to look at it the other way. It is not saying that in order to do something 
you have to examine the circumstances and see whether it mayor may not have 
an adverse environmental impact. What the precautionary principle says is that 
unless you can prove that there is no impact in advance you cannot go ahead with 
the proposed activity. This would typically be applied to industrial development, 
and so forth. But, can you imagine waging warfare under circumstances where you 
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have to prove that the armed conflict will not have an adverse impact on the 
environment in advance? Another emerging doctrine that is becoming 
increasingly common is the notion that the "polluter pays." If an industry has 
damaged the environment and it can be demonstrated that it has damaged the 
environment, it must pay to put things right. That kind of thinking presumably 
can have a huge impact on the military. There is also increasing provision for wide 
public participation in the permitting or evaluation of environmental impacts. I 
am not sure that we will necessarily see increased public participation in military 
activities as well, but that is probably going to be a problem in the future. 
Requirements for research and monitoring, and financing that research and 
monitoring, are already happening but are likely to increase and become greater 
in the future. 
I would just close by again thanking Professor Grunawalt and the panel and 
Admiral Doyle for the opportunity to speak. 
Vice Admiral Doyle,Jr.: Thank you, Arthur. We are now open for questions from 
the floor. 
Dr. Glen Plant, London School of Economics and Political Science: I am going 
to attack Bill Arkin. Bill, for a tree hugger you take a very anthropocentric view 
of the environment don't you? You are looking at human health aspects alone. 
You are not taking into account the biological or the aesthetic aspects. And, you 
are saying that what we did to the Iraqis was worse than what the Iraqis did to us, 
without looking at the intention behind the acts and without looking at the harm 
that was done overall, which was surely the only fair process to undertake. 
Mr. Arkin: I do not know that I said that what we did to the Iraqis was worse than 
what they did to us. I do not believe that, and if one has an anthropocentric view 
of the world, obviously aggressing upon one's neighbors and violating all of the 
standards of conduct in law are much worse than defending against that aggression. 
So that is my answer. As for my anthropocentric view of the world, I guess that's 
why I do not work for Greenpeace anymore. 
Vice Admiral Doyle, Jr.: Any other questions? Yes, Captain Rose. 
Captain Stephen A. Rose, JAGC, U.S. Navy, U.S. Atlantic Command: Also a 
question for Mr. Arkin who struck a lot of sparks here. I get the sense that your 
confidence in the "environmental common sense" is just that. That there is an 
ethos, or a common sense in the public weal that acts as a self-regulating 
178 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
mechanism and that a lot of what we are about here seems to be a kind of nit-picking 
or juridical soul-searching that is unnecessary. Could you elaborate on that a bit? 
Mr. Arkin: A friend of mine who read my paper said, "You do not want to say this 
Bill." One of the points he made was that in real wars, not the Gulf War, maybe 
these weapons or these methods or means of warfare would be used or people would 
perceive their use to be important because they were connected to military 
necessity. Whereas, in the Gulf War, surplus military capability allowed the 
Coalition to have many more choices and, therefore, it's compliance with the law 
was easier to ensure. I guess that is a flaw of my argument. Nevertheless, I think 
it is important to argue that environmental protection is codified in our behavior 
and actions, regardless of what U.S. interpretations of Additional Protocol I are 
or of what the law might be. If we have virtual compliance, to use a computer term 
that is popular today, it is important to codify that virtual compliance. The fact of 
the matter is that for political and public relations reasons we did not do certain 
things because the political leadership and military leadership perceived that 
doing them would have an adverse effect on public opinion. To demonstrate and 
promote that, I think, enhances the cultural norm because it creates virtual 
compliance. I would prefer to see that napalm or fuel-air explosives, or certain 
types of weapons or methods of warfare not be applied because of their adverse 
humanitarian effect and limited military utility rather than to argue endlessly 
about whether we should have better laws for that same effect. I think in the court 
of public opinion and the court of the real world, certain things are not done 
because of the perceived impact, as opposed to because of the letter of the law. 
Professor Christopher Greenwood, Cambridge University: I would like to 
startle Bill Arkin enormously by saying that I agreed with some of the things he 
said, not all of them, just some. I am quite sure that had we been able to put together 
a symposium that also had some 20 representatives of Greenpeace on one side of 
the room, probably not the same side as most of the rest of us, and 20 or so 
representatives of the Iraqi Government, they would currently be attacking Mr. 
Arkin's paper also. Whether that would make him feel better or worse I do not 
know. I would like to take up a point that Bill Arkin made and tie it into something 
that Dr. DeMarco said in his presentation and that is the very considerable 
difficulty of proving certain effects in times of war. Now, to some extent that is 
because unless you defeat your adversary completely, you just do not have access 
to the raw informational material at the end of the conflict. We do not know some 
of the effects that took place in Iraq because the Iraqi Government will not give 
us that sort ofinformation, indeed, may well not have it itself. But, there is, I think, 
a very considerable danger in this area in taking received wisdom as though it was 
proven scientific truth and that was something that as a non-scientist, I found 
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enormously valuable in the two presentations about the impact of armed conflict 
on the marine environment. What you find, if you look at the history of warfare, 
is that certain assumptions are made about the effect of military operations, that 
is, what you could and could not achieve by way of bombing, or how accurate 
bombing was capable of being, et cetera. But what hatched in the First World War, 
and then carried through and was treated as though were written on tablets of stone 
in the Second, turned out to be totally untrue. Now that is the danger on one side. 
The danger on the other is that you take a case where you cannot prove conclusively 
what military effects were brought about by depriving the Iraqi armed forces of 
access to their ordinary electricity supply. You cannot prove what those effects are 
and compare them with observable collateral side effects of those attacks on the 
power stations. There is a danger in saying, "Well, here you have an unproven 
effect, here you have a proven one. Let us focus on what we can prove, and ignore 
the other side of it completely." That, I think, would equally be a very considerable 
mistake. So taking a single, isolated, provable part of the effect on the environment 
and discarding all of the much more difficult aspects would, I think, be to 
misunderstand the way in which international law requires us to look at the 
environmental effects of warfare. 
Professor Michael Bothe, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University: My question is 
for Bill Arkin. I am puzzled about the question of the role of law. Do you think 
that the fact that most of us do not kill has nothing to do with the law, just habits, 
and common sense? This seemed to be your implication, and being a somewhat 
self-respecting lawyer, this of course, is a stance that I could not accept. I think the 
role of law is to give some certainty of expectations, to put some order in social 
rules and that is a salutary role. Having said that, I know of course, that the 
motivation of a particular person behaving as he or she does is not exclusively 
inspired by legal considerations, it is a multitude of factors. It is culture, but please, 
the law is part of that culture and, therefore, it matters. I wonder whether you did 
not neglect some parts of this culture, which I agree with you, is changing indeed. 
That being so, I think what is necessary is a cool evaluation of what really happened 
and, therefore, I think the exchange is particularly valuable because what used to 
be a traditional perception of admissible or non-admissible damage may not be 
admissible in the current circumstances, because the social conditions, the 
physical conditions, are changing. There are no more free spaces because the 
impact of the things we do is felt around the globe. If you hit the life support system 
of a big city, that is different from what it was even in the Second World War where 
the individual still lived in a context where life support systems of the big cities 
did not matter in the same way they do today. I think your paper has shown this 
quite well and in this respect I agree with you. Not any other. 
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Dr. John H. McNeill, U.S. Department of Defense: I also found the discussion 
very interesting and, following on some remarks that Chris Greenwood just made, 
I would like to focus on what Mr. Arkin was referring to earlier as the ethic, as 
opposed to the law. We can and will argue about what the law is, but with respect 
to the ethic and the realization that many of the environmental effects of military 
operations are not proven-perhaps are unprovable and unknowable, at least 
during our lifetimes-it seems that the ethic operates in a manner which affects 
political self-deterrence, at least in examples that we are familiar with here in the 
United States. I think a comparable example to the environmental side was the 
self-deterrence that operated at the end of the conflict in Iraq. You will recall that 
the media was very interested in what was going to happen with respect to the 
so-called "highway of death", which many of us remember quite vividly. That too 
involved an ethic that resulted in political self-deterrence. Similarly, we did not 
take actions in reprisal against Iraq for the wanton destruction of the 732 well 
heads. The law might have permitted us to do that, but we did not do it. Reprisal 
action in that instance was seen as something that was, as a matter of public policy, 
unacceptable. So I am wondering if the suggestion made by Mr. Arkin, that we 
ought to, in affect, codify these rules, is meant indirectly as a suggestion that the 
United States, and perhaps other members of the Coalition in the Gulf, other 
Western countries particularly, might similarly be self-deterred and, therefore, 
would benefit from rules that they were forced to observe as a political matter, 
being accepted and forced on others, even though there might not be the scientific 
ability to appreciate what the threat to the environment would be from the actions 
that would, thereby, be prohibited. It is an interesting proposition. Would you 
care to comment? 
Mr. Arkin: Let me just answer Professor Bothe first and say that I spoke that the 
law was adequate. I did not say that it was irrelevant. I just felt that the existing 
law provided the framework for everything that has been discussed today and I 
have heard nothing yet that says to me that what we have discussed does not fall 
within the framework of existing law. That is all. I meant adequate, not irrelevant. 
I think that enforcement does relate to deterrence and I will give you an 
example. Since the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. Government has been arguing 
very vociferously that Iraq is practicing a form 01 ecocide in the Southern marshes 
by diverting water away from an area that sustains an indigenous marsh life 
culture. The CIA has issued reports; a lot of attention has been paid to this. 
Madeline Albright has brought it before the U.N. Security Council. When I was 
in Iraq in 1993, I was taken on a Government trip to the marshes, including an 
Iraqi helicopter ride-which was scary in its own right, because I thought I might 
be shot down in the "No Fly Zone." One of the things that the Iraqi environmental 
people, and there are Iraqi environmental people, argued was that as mere 
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functionaries in a scientific ministry they did not really see why their changing 
the course of the Tigris River and their various canaling and channeling irrigation 
projects, as they called them, could possibly be construed by the United States as 
a violation of ecological international laws. They said, "Look at what Iraq did in 
the Gulf in terms of blowing up all those Kuwaiti oil rigs, et cetera. The 
international community never took any action as a result of what we did to the 
environment there." So their attitude was, "What we do to our environment is 
different from what we might do to your environment and since there is not 
enforcement of some standard practice that says we cannot do something to our 
own environment, than we just assume that what we do in our country is our own 
business." A part of my answer to you would be that I can show that the lack of 
any kind of international enforcement had a real impact in that the Iraqi's 
perceived that they might get away with something that they otherwise might not 
have. Another thing I would say would be that all of this discussion of the Gulf 
War is both instructive and irrelevant because of the many unique qualities of that 
conflict and the fact that we had choices to make there that we may not have to 
make in the future. It was a type of conflict where you could actually sit and choose 
targets to hit, sit and choose weapons to use, and sit and decide whether you are 
going to launch a ground war or not-I think Larry Freedman called it "war by 
appointment." It seems that that is war of a very different quality, where a lot of 
these issues of reprisal and heat of passion and what is done when you feel like you 
are losing a war or when you feel like you really have to do something to give 
yourself a step up in a war, does not really come into play. That was the situation 
in the Gulf War, at least on our side. That, I would say, is in agreement with 
Professor Bothe's point that the law is really important. You need to have legal 
standards, even in this nice casual war, to say these are still things that if this were 
a heated, passionate war, one could not do and it is unfortunate in that regard that 
there are a lot of Iraqi's running around, including the Iraqi leadership, who in 
1995 feel that they got away with murder, literally. The U.S. Government, I think, 
has been a part of that unfortunate policy. 
Vice Admiral Doyle, Jr.: We have to close our discussion here and I would like 
to thank the panel. 
